Rilke, R., Van Pelt, V., Lehnen, S., Günther, C. (accepted pre-print), Motivating low performers with input-based relative performance feedback, Contemporary Accounting Research.
Prof. Dr. Rainer Michael Rilke
Kurzbiographie:
Professor Rainer Michael Rilke ist seit April 2024 Professor für Verhaltensökonomik an der WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management. Er begann seine akademische Laufbahn mit einem Diplom in Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Universität Bonn und promovierte später in Ökonomie an der Universität zu Köln. Professor Rilke hat an renommierten Institutionen geforscht, darunter das Program on Negotiation an der Harvard University und das CREED an der Universität Amsterdam. Vor seiner aktuellen Position war er als Assistenzprofessor an der WHU tätig und brachte seine Expertise auch als Senior Consultant bei Baker Tilly Roelfs ein.
Sein Forschungsinteresse konzentriert sich auf Verhaltens- und Experimentelle Ökonomik sowie Verhaltensethik. Professor Rilkes Arbeit, die eine breite Palette von Themen wie Betrug, Selbstselektion in Teams und die Auswirkungen von Algorithmen auf menschliches Verhalten abdeckt, hat zu zahlreichen Publikationen in führenden Fachzeitschriften geführt. Durch seine Forschung trägt er wesentlich zum Verständnis komplexer ökonomischer und ethischer Fragestellungen im Zeitalter der Digitalisierung bei.
Ausbildung
| Datum | Universität | Abschluss |
| 2014 | University of Cologne | Doctoral degree at Department of Corporate Development and Business Ethics (Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Bernd Irlenbusch) |
| 2009 | University Bonn | Diploma in Economics |
| 2003 | Irmgardis Gymnasium Cologne | Abitur |
Publikationen
Günther, C., Lehnen, S., Rilke, R. (2025), Formalization of annual performance feedback and employees’ job satisfaction in the SME context, Journal of Small Business Management, Vol. 63 (3), pp. 558–589.
Janz, C., Rilke, R., Yurtoglu, B. (2025), Does ESG information impact individual investors’ portfolio choices?, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 234, 107007.
Leib, M., Köbis, N. C., Rilke, R., Hagens, M., Irlenbusch, B. (2024), Corrupted by algorithms? How AI-generated and human-written advice shape (dis)honesty, The Economic Journal, Vol. 134 (658), pp. 766–784.
Reggiani, T., Rilke, R. (2024), Designing donation incentive contracts for online gig workers, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 190 (3), pp. 553–568.
Huynh, T. L. D., Stratmann, P., Rilke, R. (2024), No influence of simple moral awareness cues on cheating behaviour in an online experiment, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Vol. 108, 102126.
Fišar, M., Greiner, B., Huber, C., Katok, E., Ozkes, A. I., Et Al. (2024), Reproducibility in management science, Management Science, Vol. 70 (3), pp. 1343-1356.
Fischer, M., Rilke, R., Yurtoglu, B. (2023), When, and why, do teams benefit from self-selection?, Experimental Economics, Vol. 26 (4), pp. 749–774.
Litvinova, Y., Rilke, R., Günther, C. (2023), Me, myself, and I: image concerns and honesty in immersive VR, Computers in Human Behavior, Vol. 149, 107950.
Rilke, R., Danilov, A., Weisel, O., Shalvi, S., Irlenbusch, B. (2021), When leading by example leads to less corrupt collaboration, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 188, pp. 288-306.
Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R., Walkowitz, G. (2019), Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency, Experimental Economics, Vol. 22 (2), pp. 552–576.
Hennig-Schmidt, H., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R., Walkowitz, G. (2018), Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: a systematic analysis, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 47 (1), pp. 301-329.
Rilke, R. (2017), On the duty to give (and not to take): an experiment on moralistic punishment, Journal of Business Economics : JBE = Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft : ZfB, Vol. 87, pp. 1129-1150.
Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Reggiani, T., Rilke, R., Sliwka, D. (2016), How to hire helpers? evidence from a field experiment, Experimental Economics, Vol. 19 (3), pp. 577–594.
Conrads, J., Reggiani, T., Rilke, R. (2016), Reducing ambiguity in lotteries: evidence from a field experiment, Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 23, pp. 206-211.
Rilke, R., Van Pelt, V., Lehnen, S., Günther, C. (accepted pre-print), Motivating low performers with input-based relative performance feedback, Contemporary Accounting Research.
Günther, C., Lehnen, S., Rilke, R. (2025), Formalization of annual performance feedback and employees’ job satisfaction in the SME context, Journal of Small Business Management, Vol. 63 (3), pp. 558–589.
Janz, C., Rilke, R., Yurtoglu, B. (2025), Does ESG information impact individual investors’ portfolio choices?, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 234, 107007.
Leib, M., Köbis, N. C., Rilke, R., Hagens, M., Irlenbusch, B. (2024), Corrupted by algorithms? How AI-generated and human-written advice shape (dis)honesty, The Economic Journal, Vol. 134 (658), pp. 766–784.
Reggiani, T., Rilke, R. (2024), Designing donation incentive contracts for online gig workers, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 190 (3), pp. 553–568.
Huynh, T. L. D., Stratmann, P., Rilke, R. (2024), No influence of simple moral awareness cues on cheating behaviour in an online experiment, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Vol. 108, 102126.
Fišar, M., Greiner, B., Huber, C., Katok, E., Ozkes, A. I., Et Al. (2024), Reproducibility in management science, Management Science, Vol. 70 (3), pp. 1343-1356.
Fischer, M., Rilke, R., Yurtoglu, B. (2023), When, and why, do teams benefit from self-selection?, Experimental Economics, Vol. 26 (4), pp. 749–774.
Litvinova, Y., Rilke, R., Günther, C. (2023), Me, myself, and I: image concerns and honesty in immersive VR, Computers in Human Behavior, Vol. 149, 107950.
Rilke, R., Danilov, A., Weisel, O., Shalvi, S., Irlenbusch, B. (2021), When leading by example leads to less corrupt collaboration, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 188, pp. 288-306.
Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R., Walkowitz, G. (2019), Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency, Experimental Economics, Vol. 22 (2), pp. 552–576.
Hennig-Schmidt, H., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R., Walkowitz, G. (2018), Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: a systematic analysis, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 47 (1), pp. 301-329.
Rilke, R. (2017), On the duty to give (and not to take): an experiment on moralistic punishment, Journal of Business Economics : JBE = Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft : ZfB, Vol. 87, pp. 1129-1150.
Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Reggiani, T., Rilke, R., Sliwka, D. (2016), How to hire helpers? evidence from a field experiment, Experimental Economics, Vol. 19 (3), pp. 577–594.
Conrads, J., Reggiani, T., Rilke, R. (2016), Reducing ambiguity in lotteries: evidence from a field experiment, Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 23, pp. 206-211.