Günther, C., Lehnen, S., Rilke, R. (accepted pre-print), Formalization of annual performance feedback and employees’ job satisfaction in the SME context, Journal of Small Business Management.
Professor Rainer Michael Rilke
Contact:
+49 (0)261 6509 814
rainer.rilke[at]whu.edu
www.rainer-rilke.de
Short biography:
Professor Rainer Michael Rilke is Professor of Behavioral Economics at WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management since April 2024. He began his academic career with a diploma in economics at the University of Bonn and later earned a doctorate in economics at the University of Cologne. Professor Rilke has conducted research at prestigious institutions, including the Program on Negotiation at Harvard University and CREED at the University of Amsterdam. Prior to his current position, he was an assistant professor at WHU and contributed his expertise as a senior consultant at Baker Tilly Roelfs.
His research interests focus on behavioral and experimental economics and behavioral ethics. Professor Rilke's work, which covers a wide range of topics such as cheating, self-selection in teams and the impact of algorithms on human behavior, has led to numerous publications in leading journals. Through his research, he contributes significantly to the understanding of complex economic and ethical issues in the age of digitalization.
Education
Date | University | Degree |
2014 | University of Cologne | Doctoral degree at Department of Corporate Development and Business Ethics (Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Bernd Irlenbusch) |
2009 | University Bonn | Diploma in Economics |
2003 | Irmgardis Gymnasium Cologne | Abitur |
Publications
Leib, M., Köbis, N. C., Rilke, R., Hagens, M., Irlenbusch, B. (2024), Corrupted by algorithms? How AI-generated and human-written advice shape (dis)honesty, The Economic Journal, Vol. 134 (658), pp. 766–784.
Reggiani, T., Rilke, R. (2024), Designing donation incentive contracts for online gig workers, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 190 (3), pp. 553–568.
Huynh, T. L. D., Stratmann, P., Rilke, R. (2024), No influence of simple moral awareness cues on cheating behaviour in an online experiment, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Vol. 108, 102126.
Fišar, M., Greiner, B., Huber, C., Katok, E., Ozkes, A. I., Et Al. (2024), Reproducibility in management science, Management Science, Vol. 70 (3), pp. 1343-1356.
Fischer, M., Rilke, R., Yurtoglu, B. (2023), When, and why, do teams benefit from self-selection?, Experimental Economics, Vol. 26 (4), pp. 749–774.
Litvinova, Y., Rilke, R., Günther, C. (2023), Me, myself, and I: image concerns and honesty in immersive VR, Computers in Human Behavior, Vol. 149, 107950.
Rilke, R., Danilov, A., Weisel, O., Shalvi, S., Irlenbusch, B. (2021), When leading by example leads to less corrupt collaboration, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 188, pp. 288-306.
Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R., Walkowitz, G. (2019), Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency, Experimental Economics, Vol. 22 (2), pp. 552–576.
Hennig-Schmidt, H., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R., Walkowitz, G. (2018), Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: a systematic analysis, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 47 (1), pp. 301-329.
Rilke, R. (2017), On the duty to give (and not to take): an experiment on moralistic punishment, Journal of Business Economics : JBE = Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft : ZfB, Vol. 87, pp. 1129-1150.
Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Reggiani, T., Rilke, R., Sliwka, D. (2016), How to hire helpers? evidence from a field experiment, Experimental Economics, Vol. 19 (3), pp. 577–594.
Conrads, J., Reggiani, T., Rilke, R. (2016), Reducing ambiguity in lotteries: evidence from a field experiment, Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 23, pp. 206-211.
Team-goal incentives and individual lying behavior
Conrads, J., Ellenberger, M., Irlenbusch, B., Ohms, E., Rilke, R., Walkowitz, G. (2016), Team-goal incentives and individual lying behavior: Zielanreize in Teams und individuelles Lügenverhalten, Die Betriebswirtschaft, Vol. 76 (1), pp. 103-123.
Rilke, R., Schurr, A., Barkan, R., Shalvi, S. (2016), One-by-one or all-at-once? self-reporting policies and dishonesty, Frontiers in Psychology, Vol. 7 (113).
Günther, C., Lehnen, S., Rilke, R. (accepted pre-print), Formalization of annual performance feedback and employees’ job satisfaction in the SME context, Journal of Small Business Management.
Leib, M., Köbis, N. C., Rilke, R., Hagens, M., Irlenbusch, B. (2024), Corrupted by algorithms? How AI-generated and human-written advice shape (dis)honesty, The Economic Journal, Vol. 134 (658), pp. 766–784.
Reggiani, T., Rilke, R. (2024), Designing donation incentive contracts for online gig workers, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 190 (3), pp. 553–568.
Huynh, T. L. D., Stratmann, P., Rilke, R. (2024), No influence of simple moral awareness cues on cheating behaviour in an online experiment, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Vol. 108, 102126.
Fišar, M., Greiner, B., Huber, C., Katok, E., Ozkes, A. I., Et Al. (2024), Reproducibility in management science, Management Science, Vol. 70 (3), pp. 1343-1356.
Fischer, M., Rilke, R., Yurtoglu, B. (2023), When, and why, do teams benefit from self-selection?, Experimental Economics, Vol. 26 (4), pp. 749–774.
Litvinova, Y., Rilke, R., Günther, C. (2023), Me, myself, and I: image concerns and honesty in immersive VR, Computers in Human Behavior, Vol. 149, 107950.
Rilke, R., Danilov, A., Weisel, O., Shalvi, S., Irlenbusch, B. (2021), When leading by example leads to less corrupt collaboration, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 188, pp. 288-306.
Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R., Walkowitz, G. (2019), Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency, Experimental Economics, Vol. 22 (2), pp. 552–576.
Hennig-Schmidt, H., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R., Walkowitz, G. (2018), Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: a systematic analysis, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 47 (1), pp. 301-329.
Rilke, R. (2017), On the duty to give (and not to take): an experiment on moralistic punishment, Journal of Business Economics : JBE = Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft : ZfB, Vol. 87, pp. 1129-1150.
Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Reggiani, T., Rilke, R., Sliwka, D. (2016), How to hire helpers? evidence from a field experiment, Experimental Economics, Vol. 19 (3), pp. 577–594.
Conrads, J., Reggiani, T., Rilke, R. (2016), Reducing ambiguity in lotteries: evidence from a field experiment, Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 23, pp. 206-211.
Team-goal incentives and individual lying behavior
Conrads, J., Ellenberger, M., Irlenbusch, B., Ohms, E., Rilke, R., Walkowitz, G. (2016), Team-goal incentives and individual lying behavior: Zielanreize in Teams und individuelles Lügenverhalten, Die Betriebswirtschaft, Vol. 76 (1), pp. 103-123.
Rilke, R., Schurr, A., Barkan, R., Shalvi, S. (2016), One-by-one or all-at-once? self-reporting policies and dishonesty, Frontiers in Psychology, Vol. 7 (113).